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Since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, energy policy in Japan and 
Germany appears to have taken radically different directions. In contrast 
to Germany’s consensus for an Energiewende (“energy transition”), Japan 
has renewed its political support for nuclear power. Yet, energy transitions 
in both countries are highly contested – with a much less predictable future 
than government plans would like us to believe. 
 • Japan has always connected energy self-sufficiency with national security due 
to its lack of natural resources and its isolated – as well as fragmented – na-
tional electricity grid. In contrast, Germany has a single grid, can trade electri-
city with its neighbours, and has large coal reserves. 
 • In Japan, nuclear power became a quasi “home-grown” energy source without 
strong opposition, while in Germany it has been increasingly contested by the 
“coal lobby,” wind power, and the public.
 • When the Fukushima disaster happened, both countries generated about 30 
per cent of their electricity from nuclear power plants. Both countries had am-
bitious renewable targets already beforehand. Today, renewables account for 
38 per cent of electricity production in Germany and 15.6 per cent in Japan.
 • In both countries, the Fukushima disaster caused the collapse of the “safety 
myth” of nuclear power plants. In Germany, the long history of contestation 
over a nuclear phase-out and the broad public anti-nuclear consensus made a 
return to nuclear impossible. In Japan, anti-nuclear protests accelerated only 
after the Fukushima disaster. Thus with Prime Minister Abe’s pledge to put the 
economy back on track, Japan is taking the political risk of reactor restarts. 
Policy Implications
Energy transition is as much a reality in Japan as it is in Germany. Renewable 
energies have been evolving even more rapidly in Japan than in Germany in re­
cent years, a trend further fuelled by current dynamics in the energy sector. Old 
regimes of energy policies are obsolete, and it is time to replace outdated analyt­
ic al models with more dynamic ones to interpret national energy transitions and 
to pave the way for informed policymaking.
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Japan’s Energy Transition at a Turning Point
since the nuclear disaster in Fukushima of 2011, the simplified yet widespread story 
has been that because the German government made the subsequent decision to 
phase out nuclear power and pursue “energy transition” (or Energiewende) renew-
able energies have received a strong push. In contrast, scholars describe Japanese 
policymakers as manipulated by the nuclear lobby – thus hindering an energy tran-
sition and expansion of renewables in Japan. 
This article takes a more long-term view on energy transition, and demon-
strates that large shifts in energy supply – whether in Germany or Japan – depend 
on a complex set of political, economic, and technological factors that cannot easily 
be predicted. Further, nuclear power and national energy transitions are very emo-
tionally charged issues and as such are highly contested, with an ever-increasing 
number of actors – from politics, industry, and civil society – involved. This results 
in a future that is much less predictable than government plans would like us to 
believe. Despite strong attempts by the Japanese government and the nuclear in-
dustry to revive nuclear power, there are clear signs that the country has reached 
a turning point towards an energy transition with accelerating shares of renewable 
energies. 
Energy Policies in Germany and Japan before Fukushima
From the 1960s to 1980s, Germany and Japan followed a similar energy policy of 
“competitive accelerated adjustment” (cherp et al. 2016: 5) to balance their en-
ergy demands with secure supply: their rapid industrialisation, increasing energy 
demands, and the oil shocks of the 1970s provided the impetus to expand their nu-
clear power, restructure industries, and to promote efficiency. Differences between 
Germany and Japan emerged in the early 1990s, when the electricity demand of the 
former stagnated while it continued to grow in the latter. For Japan, which lacks 
natural resources to generate electricity (imports supply about 60–80 per cent 
thereof) and is spatially isolated from neighbouring countries, nuclear power was 
an opportune political answer to ensuring energy security. Moreover, Japan was 
developing “energy angst” (Calder 2008) related not only to its high dependence on 
Middle eastern oil and gas, but also to growing concerns with Asian energy markets 
as competitors – in part due to China’s switch in 1993 from being an oil exporter to 
the world’s largest oil importer (cherp et al. 2016: 5). 
In Germany, 75–90 per cent of electricity was generated using domestic re-
sources during the same period – especially its highly subsidised large coal re-
serves. In addition, wind power technology diffused to Germany from neighbouring 
Denmark. This was triggered by an electricity feed-in law entering into force in 
1990, which obliged German electric utilities to buy from small producers at close-
to-retail prices. The law, which had aimed to benefit a small number of micro-hydro 
plant owners, unexpectedly led to almost a 100-fold rise in wind installations in 
Germany. While at the time still insignificant in terms of electricity, a large and vo-
cal lobby of wind turbine owners and manufacturers developed. In fact, the wind 
sector provided less than one-tenth of nuclear electricity – but nonetheless offered 
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more jobs than it. By contrast, Japan did not see any considerable growth in wind 
power until very recently (cherp et al. 2016). 
rather, for Japan, nuclear power became a quasi “home-grown” energy source 
which the Japanese government sold as the only plausible response to its energy 
angst. Key players of the so-called nuclear village, a network of government and 
private sector actors prioritising the development of nuclear power to maintain 
energy security, provided institutional financial support for host communities and 
developed public relations campaigns and educational programmes to promote nu-
clear energy (Feldhoff 2014). The public was reassured that nuclear power plants 
were absolutely harmless. In Germany, nuclear power had been accompanied by 
widespread social protest and activism, starting in the mid-1970s – although the 
anti-nuclear movement lost momentum in the early 1980s. The chernobyl disas-
ter in 1986, which shattered the industry’s long-cherished “safety myth,” revived 
the nuclear debate in Germany. Although the government remained committed to 
nuclear power and its output peaked in the 1990s (contributing 29 per cent of elec-
tricity supply, while in Japan it reached 27 per cent), it appealed for a combined 
international effort to increase safety standards. These new requirements increased 
the cost of nuclear energy and, thus, impacted the industry’s plans for expansion. As 
an example: siemens, which was involved in the construction of all German nuclear 
reactors, sold its reactor business to the French company Framatome in 2001, and 
in 2011 announced the end of its nuclear activities (cherp et al. 2016: 7). 
Phasing out nuclear power became a core project for Germany’s first social 
Democratic Party and Green Party coalition government. The so-called Atomkon­
sens (“nuclear consensus”) contract – a phase-out agreement with the major electric 
utilities – was signed in June 2000. However, a new government in 2009 approved 
an extended phase-out period in order to allow for nuclear electricity generation as 
a bridging technology on the way to decarbonisation of the country’s energy sys-
tem. The decision was highly controversial at the time, and it was quickly reversed 
after Fukushima. In contrast, Japan built 15 new reactors in the 1990s and five 
after 2000 (by 2011, it had 54 in total). In addition to large and stable research and 
development funding, the Japanese government overpowered local resistance to 
nuclear power by increasing monetary support for the host communities of nuclear 
power plants (Feldhoff 2014), thus preventing the development of a powerful na-
tionwide anti-nuclear movement. Although several reactor accidents occurred dur-
ing the 1990s and public opposition to nuclear power plants grew, it was only after 
Fukushima that Japan saw anti-nuclear protests on a hitherto unimaginable scale. 
While phasing out nuclear power, Germany expanded wind and solar. Both 
Germany and Japan have promoted solar photovoltaic (PV) power technology since 
the 1970s. Japan expanded its role with the Alternative energy Act (1980), which 
supported solar and other “alternative” energy sources through financial, techni-
cal, and regulatory measures. It was Japan rather than Germany that first became 
the global solar PV leader. During the 1990s, the use of solar PV power was still 
at a low level, but increased in both countries – with Japan installing six to seven 
times larger capacity than Germany (cherp et al. 2016: 10). In the 2000s, Japan 
was named the world leader in solar PV; impressive advances in photovoltaics were 
ignored, though, because the nuclear village used their political influence to favour 
nuclear power. In Germany, the renewable energy source Act (energieeinspei-
segesetz, eeG) of 2000 changed the situation by providing very high feed-in tariffs 
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for solar power. Thereafter, Germany overtook Japan in both the installation and 
manufacturing of solar PV panels. 
In 2010, both Japan and Germany adopted comprehensive and somewhat simi-
lar energy plans for the next two decades. In Germany, the Energiekonzept (“energy 
concept”) aimed to reduce the use of coal by 2.7 times, increase non-hydro renew-
ables by 2.4 times, and triple solar PV output by 2030. In Japan, the third Basic 
energy Plan (BeP) proposed to reduce the use of fossils by 2.5 times, almost triple 
non-hydro renewables, and planned for an estimated 15–20 times increase in solar 
power by 2030 (Duffield and Woodall 2011). In order to reduce the use of coal, both 
plans also envisioned a larger role for nuclear power: The German Energiekonzept 
proposed an extension of the lifetime of nuclear power plants, and in Japan the 
BeP proposed to double nuclear power output (to cover over 40 per cent of energy 
requirements by 2020, and 53 per cent by 2030) – by constructing 14 new reactors 
in addition to the existing 54. Japan was at that time the world’s third-largest pro-
ducer of nuclear power after France and the united states (cherp et al. 2016). The 
rationales cited in both Germany’s and Japan’s energy plans were energy security, 
environmental sustainability (both issued ambitious greenhouse gas emission re-
duction targets), and economic efficiency. The BeP 2010 named these “3es” as the 
rationale for why “the government itself will continue taking the lead in the further 
development of nuclear energy” (cherp et al. 2016: 9; MeTI 2010). 
Post-Fukushima Energy Policies in Germany and Japan 
Although the energy paths of Germany and Japan had differed since the 1990s, 
when the Fukushima nuclear accident happened on 3 March 2011 both were gen-
erating about 30 per cent of their electricity from nuclear power plants (Feldhoff 
2014). After the accident, this percentage dropped precipitously in both countries. 
Japan shut down all of its nuclear power plants temporarily or permanently. since 
then it has been coping with capacity loss through drastic reductions in electricity 
consumption, and by burning more gas, oil, and coal in conventional thermal power 
plants. About half of the generating capacity lost after Fukushima was compensated 
for by voluntary reductions driven by the setsuden (“energy-saving”) movement 
(Feldhoff 2014), which is still strong today. Japan currently ranks as the world’s 
largest importer of liquified natural gas and second-largest of coal, behind china. 
Germany compensated for its own capacity loss after Fukushima with domestic coal 
and renewables. Both countries have managed to maintain a secure energy supply 
at reasonable prices with far less nuclear power than before Fukushima, but their 
high fossil fuel consumption has caused rising CO2 emissions – invoking national 
and international criticism. Japan’s plans to construct new coal-fired power plants 
further fuels national and international protests. 
For Germany, Fukushima has put an entirely new relevance on the term “re-
sidual risk,” demonstrating the “genuine threat” of nuclear power plants. Thus it 
returned to the phase-out timeline previously agreed in the Atomkonsens, and ac-
celerated its energy transition. Within six months of Fukushima, eight of Germany’s 
17 nuclear reactors had been shut down permanently and new regulations to phase 
out nuclear energy by 2022 come into effect. Given the highly contested history of 
nuclear phase-out and the broad public antinuclear consensus in Germany, a return 
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to nuclear energy is not a viable political option today. In the direct aftermath of 
Fukushima, Germany’s future targets for renawables were moderate; in January 
2018, however, the German government agreed to establish a target share of 65 
per cent for renewables in 2030. Domestic energy resources (e.g. coal, with which 
Germany still covers about 40 per cent of its primary energy consumption) offered 
an immediate option to fill the energy gap caused by this shutting down of nuclear 
power plants. Moreover, Germany’s integration in an emerging european (renew-
able) energy market – which can provide back-up power if necessary – as well as 
policy instruments to support renewable capacity expansion already being in place 
(e.g. the eeG) substantially reduced the uncertainties of Germany’s response to 
Fukushima.  
For Japan, the situation was different; so were the responses. The government 
fundamentally revised its nuclear safety measures after Fukushima (3Es + “S” for 
“safety”), and in 2012 the Nuclear regulatory Authority (NrA) was established to 
inspect nuclear reactors under new safety regulations. Public opposition to nuclear 
power generation quickly strengthened and, in response to a growing distrust in the 
political elites and bureaucracy, interest in citizen science has grown in Japan (as 
well as elsewhere). one prominent example is the online platform safecast (https://
safecast.jp), developed by Japanese citizens for measuring, collecting, and publish-
ing data on radiation exposure independent of official statements. In view of fake 
news, alternative facts, and the co-option of academic experts by policymakers, 
citizen science has been portrayed as a “(re)vitalization of Japanese democracy” 
(Feldhoff 2018: 13).
Against this background, in mid-2012, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
administration published a policy of zero nuclear power by the 2030s. Moreover, 
in the face of strong opposition by the utility firms that had had their nuclear power 
plants shut down after Fukushima, the Japanese government introduced a new 
feed-in tariff system in July 2012 (for details, see Kimura 2017). In other countries, 
especially in Europe, such systems had been successfully used to foster renewable 
energy investment by major utilities and start-up firms, driving technological inno-
vation and leading to lower costs for consumers. In Japan, the percentage of renew-
able energy jumped from about 9 per cent nationwide in 2011 to 15 per cent in 2016. 
The government has not defined specific expansion targets for individual renewable 
energy resources, but PV systems account for the majority of new installations. In 
June 2016, the Abe government reformed the scheme to make renewable power 
generation more difficult and less lucrative. Nevertheless, the basic prin ciples re-
main in place.  
After the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained power in september 2012, 
it started to drew up a mid-term energy policy in the fourth BeP (published April 
2014) – the first to be formulated after the Fukushima disaster. Here, nuclear power 
is again positioned as a significant “base load power source” (MeTI 2014: 10). This 
might have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the still-powerful nuclear 
village in Japan. With rising energy imports and electricity prices, a widening trade 
deficit, and Prime Minister Abe’s pledge to put the economy back on track, Japan is 
taking the political risk of reactor restarts and claiming that the effects of the Fuku-
shima disaster are controllable. Again, Japan’s energy angst and economic issues 
are strong guiding principles to justify government policy. Japan’s competition with 
neighbouring countries for access to energy resources has increased, and regional 
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collaboration with regard to energy security is difficult given the burdens of history 
in the country’s international relations. 
regarding renewable energy, the 2014 BeP states that by promoting energy 
efficiency and conservation, accelerating the introduction of renewable energy and 
optimizing coal power generation and other forms of thermal power generation, 
dependence on nuclear power would be reduced to the maximum extent possible 
(MeTI 2014). However the BeP sets the target value for nuclear power (20–22 per 
cent) at almost the same level as for renewable energy (22–24 per cent), a target al-
most unchanged from the 2010 BeP. Japan’s fifth BeP (published July 2018) reas-
serted the above figures for Japan’s energy mix in 2030, and additionally addressed 
long-term options until the year 2050. renewables should be turned into “main-
stay” power sources that are self-reliant in economic terms (MeTI 2018: 46). schol-
ars take this statement as a committment of the Japanese government to fostering 
renewables. At the same time, the plan has been highly criticised for not making 
an upward revision in the share of renewables in the overall energy mix envisaged 
for 2030. As the share of renewables has already grown to more than 15 per cent in 
Japan, there is a high possibility that the numerical goal will be achieved well ahead 
of the initially planned year date. 
Perspectives on Japan’s Energy Transition: From Consensus to 
Controversy
The current government wants nuclear reactors to be reactivated as soon as pos-
sible. However this depends on a number of external factors. These include eco-
nomic considerations, including utility firms’ cost–benefit analyses on the implica-
tions of restart or shutdown, the impact of electricity deregulation and intensified 
market competition, local political and public opposition, Japan’s ability to renew 
and export its technology, as well as decisions taken by other important nuclear-
producing countries.  
Sceptics say that the Japanese government’s nuclear target of 20–22 per cent 
for 2030 is unrealistic, given the current status of nuclear power production, long 
delays to restarts, and the demanding and expensive clean-up operation at Fuku-
shima. In 2017, nuclear power production in Japan contributed only 2.8 per cent of 
annual electric energy output. With nine reactors operating in 2018, nuclear’s share 
will reach 6.5 per cent. In order to achieve the target of 20–22 per cent by 2030, it 
would be necessary to operate approximately 30 nuclear power plants (Kucharski 
and unesaki 2018). The 54 reactors operating before Fukushima have been reduced 
to 39, with the loss of six units at Fukushima Daiichi and nine other older ones 
having commenced decommissioning already. of these 39, the NrA has received 
restart applications for 26. under the stringent new nuclear safety standards, 14 
nuclear power plants have passed review since Fukushima (of which, the above-
mentioned nine have successfully resumed operations) while 12 are still in the re-
view process; it is uncertain how long this will take. Thus, to achieve the govern-
ment’s goal, either new reactors have to be constructed and/or some of the existing 
one must have their licences extended beyond the statutory 40-year term – which, 
according to regulations, is indeed possible in exceptional cases. In fact, in october 
2016, three reactors were approved by the NrA to operate beyond this time limit, 
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for an additional 20 years (cherp et al. 2016). estimates show that it will cost more 
than eur 8 billion to build a new nuclear plant or expand an existing one to meet 
the updated safety standards. It is questionable whether power companies can af-
ford these costs – even with government support.
Moreover, reaffirming high targets for nuclear power could still trigger a back-
lash – although the anti-nuclear movement in Japan may have lost momentum over 
the years. Nevertheless, according to a recent media survey, more than 80 per cent 
of respondents said that they remain concerned about the risk of a severe accident, 
and more than 60 per cent called for phasing out nuclear energy in the future (JT 
2018). Anti-nuclear protests continue to some extent; one well-known example is 
the Federation for the Promotion of Zero-Nuclear Power and renewable energy 
(genjiren, officially established in May 2017, www.genjiren.com) that continues its 
anti-nuclear campaign throughout Japan with prominent support: former prime 
minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi is its advisor. 
Despite the persisting pro-nuclear policy of the Japanese government, in real-
ity the energy sector will only continue to evolve. Following the introduction of the 
feed-in tariff system in 2012, the establishment of new regulatory institutions (e.g. 
the NrA), and the liberalisation of electricity retailing which began in April 2016, 
the “rules of the energy game” have changed, resulting in a more dynamic process 
of interaction and decision-making among a broader range of energy-related insti-
tutions than in the past (Kucharski and unesaki 2018; GJeTc 2017). New entrants 
into Japan’s supply market have emerged; the renewable energy business sector 
continues to expand, innovate, and attract new players. Thus, Japan’s traditional 
energy sector is being challenged. More than 400 new retail companies had been li-
censed by september 2017. The number of consumers switching from the 10-major 
electric power companies to other retail companies had reached almost 3.8 million 
(about 6 per cent of all customers) by 30 June 2017. Also, the bigger customers are 
switching between regional Japanese power companies. As various websites that 
compare electricity prices are launched, attention is focused on keeping them as 
low as possible. The sales share of the new licensed retail companies (excluding the 
10-major electric power companies) had reached about 11.4 per cent of total electric 
power demand, and their share had increased to over 20 per cent in the areas of 
Tokyo, Kansai, and Hokkaido, by June 2017 (Kucharski and unesaki 2018). 
Moreover, after Fukushima, Japan’s population started to undertake initiatives 
to work on community-based renewable energy planning and development. The 
Ministry of environment in 2011 set up a support programme for communities to 
start up renewable energy projects. These community power plans flourished after 
the feed-in tariff was introduced. By the end of 2016, nearly 200 community power 
enterprises had emerged. According to data from the Institute for Sustainabe En-
ergy Policies (IseP), a total of 50 municipalities in Japan were estimated to be fully 
self-sufficient on the basis of renewable energy and even able to sell surpluses to 
the grid (IseP et al. 2017). The nationwide spread of the German Stadtwerke (“mu-
nicipal utilities”) model since Fukushima is further spurring these developments. 
To sum up, Japan’s energy system has already moved from a highly centralised 
to a more decentralised system, relying increasingly on renewable energy sources. 
With this, Japan is following a universal trend of decentralisation: “The pathways of 
countries differ, but the trend to decentralization is universal” (Hennicke 2018: 23). 
recent natural disasters like the 6.7 magnitude earthquake on 6 september 2018 in 
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northern Japan, causing an electricity knock-out of the entire island of Hokkaido 
(the size of Austria), further accelerate the development of decentralised electricity 
supply structures relying on renewables – with the side effect of supporting Japan’s 
regional revitalisation plans, too. 
Japan’s nuclear industry is also undergoing rapid change, and its three indus-
trial icons Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) – who are all 
also active in nuclear reactor design and engineering – are struggling. Despite a 
continuing interest in exporting nuclear reactor technology, the international mar-
ket for that is limited and subject to fierce competition from china, russia, and 
south Korea. Attempts to get Japanese companies to act collaboratively in the Viet-
namese market floundered when the government of the latter decided to pull out 
of a usD 11 billion deal in November 2016 due to safety fears (Incerti and Lipscy 
2018: 621). Toshiba almost went bankrupt following revelations of large losses in 
its nuclear division, Westinghouse electric, forcing the company to sell off some of 
its highly successful semiconductor business. In February 2018, Toshiba sold the 
Westinghouse business to a us private equity firm, offloading it for usD 1 billion 
less than it had itself paid 10 years earlier. At the beginning of December 2018, the 
national media reported that a Japan-led public–private consortium, overseen by 
MHI, was set to abandon a Turkish nuclear power project as cost estimates had 
nearly doubled. The original usD 22 billion export deal for the construction of Tur-
key’s second nuclear reactor was agreed upon by the Japanese and Turkish govern-
ment in 2013. Hitachi’s nuclear power plant projects in the united Kingdom – for 
which the company has already spent usD 3 billion – faces difficulties to proceed, 
also because the uK government is currently very much focused on the challenges 
of Brexit. 
Energy Transition in Japan as Much a Reality as in Germany 
Japanese government rhetoric notwithstanding, fundamental economic changes, 
declining investments in nuclear technology from the private sector, and intense 
civil society opposition will make a full-blown return to nuclear power difficult – 
eventually paving the way for a strong growth in renewables. Despite the influence 
of Japan’s nuclear lobby, the country’s transition away from nuclear – and eventu-
ally also fossil fuel – energy sources and towards renewables is well on its way. In 
reality, renewables have been evolving more rapidly in Japan in recent years than in 
Germany – even though the former’s share of renewables still remains more modest 
than the latter’s. This trend will be further fuelled by an increased push for decen-
tralisation, as Fukushima not only questioned the safety myth of nuclear power but 
also the traditional centralised electricity system itself. While the final outcome of 
Japan’s energy transition remains to be seen, it is clear that the balance of power 
shaping the country’s energy future has, by now, fundamentally and irreversibly 
shifted. 
While in Japan the nuclear village still plays a major role in formulating energy 
policy, other actors have also emerged – and a more complex dynamic shaping the 
country’s energy system is now at play. At the same time, the shift to greater reli-
ance on competitive markets implies less predictability and more ambiguity around 
reaching the goals of the latest strategic energy plans. What is clear from the Ger-
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man case is that guaranteed feed-in tariffs and regulatory changes that foster in-
creased regional competition can have market consequences that go well beyond 
the imagination of government planners. In a similar way as the “nuclear village” 
in Japan, the coal lobby in Germany is still strong and thus hindering the spread 
of alternative energies, with differnt dynamics at play. Thus, it is also time to re-
place outdated analytical models, through which to interpret change, with more 
dynamic ones that better take economic and technological changes into account. 
Moreover, given the fact that nuclear power and national energy transitions are 
very emotionally charged issues, a diverse and independent research community is 
a precondition for informed decision-making. The German-Japanese energy Tran-
sition council (GJeTc), whose first meeting took place in september 2016, is one 
example of facilitating the scientific exchange of experiences in energy transition, 
and mutual learning. 
For Japan, a return to nuclear energy as a major source of electricity will re-
main challenging and contested – even despite looking back to only a recent history 
of controversy regarding nuclear power. In any case the uncertainty around nuclear 
energy in Japan will remain high, for numerous reasons. Not only will any major 
seismic event immediately derail plans to put existing plants into production, let 
alone plans to build new ones, what is perhaps more important is that the uncer-
tainty over nuclear technology makes it more and more difficult for companies to 
justify their investments in it. As a consequence, overall investment in nuclear en-
ergy and technology is likely to decline. This is partly also a generational problem. 
Technical experts hired by heavy engineering companies during the heyday of nu-
clear power expansion are increasingly reaching retirement age, and recruiting new 
talent will become ever-more difficult. Further, public opposition to nuclear power 
is unlikely to diminish any time soon either.
For policymakers in Germany and Europe, the looming changes in Japan’s en-
ergy regime carry a number of implications. As nuclear energy in Japan turns more 
into a “sunset technology,” the country’s market for nuclear technology may well 
decline. By contrast, investments in renewable energy sources are likely to increase 
– and may do so even without significant political support. For european companies 
this could create interesting opportunities to export technology and expertise, while 
providing (again) more common ground for policymakers especially in Germany 
and Japan in such areas as climate change or investment in renewables technology.
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